

FUNCTIONAL SAFETY CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the

1750 Series Poppet Valve

manufactured by

Rotork Midland Ltd

Patrick Gregory Rd Wolverhampton West Midlands WV11 3DZ UK

has been assessed by Sira Certification Service with reference to the CASS methodologies and found to meet the requirements of

IEC61508-1:2010 (Clause 6) IEC 61508-2:2010

The Product and its associated data contained herein can be considered for use in the design of safety functions up to and including

SIL 3*

when used in accordance with the scope and conditions of this certificate.

* The Product that has been certified is not implicit of the achieved Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of the safety related system

wunnas

Certification Manager:

W Thomas

Initial Certification: 06/01/2012 This certificate issued: 16/02/2017 Renewal date: 15/02/2022

This certificate may only be reproduced in its entirety, without any change.



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
Sira Certification Service Part of CSA Group UK

Unit 6 Hawarden Industrial Park, Hawarden, CH5 3US, United Kingdom.

Product description and scope of certification

The 1750 Series of 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valves are a range of compact poppet valves in stainless steel for use on gases and liquids.

(1/4" – 1/2") 1750 Series 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valve				
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To answer the Webs and annual	Safety Function:			
'To ensure the Valve returns to a spring extended position when de-energized'				
	Type A	Proof Test Interval =8760Hrs ^[4]	SIL3	
Architectural constraints:	HFT=0	MTTR = 8 Hrs[4]	JILJ	
	SFF 90.83%			
Dondon horderon follows	$\lambda_{DD} = 0$	$\lambda_{SD} = 0$		
Random hardware failures:	$\lambda_{DU} = 7.77E-08$	$\lambda_{\text{SU}} = 7.69E-07$		
Probability of failure on demand:	PFD _{AVG} =3.41E-04 SIL3			
Probability of failure off definatio.	(Low Demand Mode)			
Probability of Dangerous failure on	PFH = 7.77E-08 SIL3			
safety function:	(High Demand Mode)			
Hardware safety integrity compliance ^[1]	Route 1 _H			
Systematic safety integrity compliance ^[1]	Route 1s			
Systematic Capability ^[2]	SC 3			
ojstomatio supubmity				
	SIL 3 (Low Demand)			
Overall SIL-capability achieved ^[3]				
	SIL 3 (High Demand)			



- [1] These are new parameters used in IEC61508 Part 2 Sections 7.4.2 & 7.4.4.
- This is a new measurable scale for the systematic safety integrity level; refer to IEC61508 Part 4 Section 3.5.9.
- [3] This is determined by the lowest SIL indicated by each of the parameters given above.
- [4] These figures are used only for demonstration purposes.



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
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Unit 6 Hawarden Industrial Park, Hawarden, CH5 3US, United Kingdom.

(¾" – 2") 1750 Series 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valve			
Safety Function:			
'To ensure the Valve returns to a spring extended position when de-energized'			
Architectural constraints:	Type A Proof Test Interval =8760Hrs ^[4] HFT=0 MTTR = 8 Hrs ^[4] SFF 98.25%		SIL3
Random hardware failures:	$\lambda_{DD} = 0$ $\lambda_{SD} = 0$		
Random nardware failules.	$\lambda_{DU} = 1.28E-07$ $\lambda_{SU} = 7.18E-06$		
Probability of failure on demand:		SIL3	
Probability of Dangerous failure on	PFH = 1.28E-07		SIL2
safety function:	(High Demand Mode	9)	
Hardware safety integrity compliance ^[1] Route 1 _H			
Systematic safety integrity compliance ^[1] Route 1s			
Systematic Capability ^[2]	SC 3		
Overall SIL-capability achieved ^[3]	SIL 3 (Low Demand)		
Overall 312 supublity deflicated	SIL 2 (High Demand)		



- [1] These are new parameters used in IEC61508 Part 2 Sections 7.4.2 & 7.4.4.
- [2] This is a new measurable scale for the systematic safety integrity level; refer to IEC61508 Part 4 Section 3.5.9.
- [3] This is determined by the lowest SIL indicated by each of the parameters given above.
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
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(3") 1750 Series 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valve			
Safety Function:			
'To ensure the Valve returns to a spring extended position when de-energized'			
Architectural constraints:	Type A HFT=0 SFF 92.58%	Proof Test Interval =8760Hrs ^[4] MTTR = 8 Hrs ^[4]	SIL3
Random hardware failures:	$\lambda_{DD} = 0$ $\lambda_{SD} = 0$		
Random nardware failules.	$\lambda_{DU} = 5.99E-08$ $\lambda_{SU} = 7.49E-07$		
Probability of failure on demand:	PFD _{AVG} =2.63E-04 SIL3 (Low Demand Mode)		
Probability of Dangerous failure on	PFH = 5.99E-08	SIL3	
safety function:	(High Demand Mode)		
Hardware safety integrity compliance ^[1]	lware safety integrity compliance ^[1] Route 1 _H		
Systematic safety integrity compliance ^[1]	ystematic safety integrity compliance ^[1] Route 1 _s		
Systematic Capability ^[2]	SC 3		
Overall SIL-capability achieved ^[3]	SIL 3 (Low Demand)		
Overall 312 supublity deflicated	SIL 3 (High Demand)		



- [1] These are new parameters used in IEC61508 Part 2 Sections 7.4.2 & 7.4.4.
- ^[2] This is a new measurable scale for the systematic safety integrity level; refer to IEC61508 Part 4 Section 3.5.9.
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Element Safety Function(s)1

The safety function of the 1750 Series of 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valves is defined as:

'To ensure the valve returns to the spring extended position when pilot de-energised'

That is to say: -

- o To Open a Normally Open Poppet Valve, or
- o To Close a Normally Closed Poppet Valve

The Safe State¹ of the EUC¹ is to be achieved when the product Closes a NC or Opens a NO direct acting valve.

The element safety function is intended for use in low / high or continuous demand *Mode Of Operation*¹ as indicated by the certified failure data overleaf.

The failure data above is supported by the base information given in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Information supporting the failure rate data

1	Product identification:	1750 Series of 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valves as described in manufacturer's product catalogue.
2	Functional specification:	Refer to paragraph above 'Use in safety functions' and full specification in manufacturer's product catalogue.
3	Environment limits:	Temperature range: -20°C to +180°C (standard) -50°C to +90°C (low temperature version)
4	Lifetime/replacement limits:	Refer to Installation, Operation and Maintenance Manual
5	Proof Test requirements:	Refer to user manual
6	Maintenance requirements:	Refer to user manual
7	Diagnostic coverage:	N/A
8	Diagnostic test interval:	N/A
9	Repair constraints:	Refer to user manual
10	Evidence of similar conditions in previous use:	Compliance Route 2 _H (proven-in-use) not used
11	Evidence supporting the application under different conditions of use:	Compliance Route 2н (proven-in-use) not used
12	Evidence of period of operational use:	Compliance Route 2 _H (proven-in-use) not used
13	Statement of restrictions on functionality:	Compliance Route 2 _H (proven-in-use) not used
14	Systematic capability:	SC3
15	Systematic fault avoidance measures:	Refer to Systematic Assessment report 56A25037B
16	Systematic fault tolerance measures:	Refer to Systematic Assessment report 56A25037B
17	Validation records:	Refer to Validation Report.

¹ Refer to IEC 61508-4 for a definition of this term



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Identification of certified equipment

The certified equipment and its safe use are defined in the manufacturer's documentation listed in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Certified drawings

1750 Series of 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valves

Document no.	Pages	Rev	Date	Document description
	1	2	20/10/03	1/4" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET VALVE PILOT
SSBVM8/3NV				OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	26/08/04	LOW TEMPERATURE 1/4" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET
SSBVM8/3NEP ^[1]				VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	2	15/11/02	3/8" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET VALVE PILOT
SSBVM12/3NV				OPERATED SPRING RETURN
0000 (000000000000000000000000000000000	1	1	21/12/05	LOW TEMPERATURE 3/8" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET
SSBVM12/3NEP ^[1]	_	_		VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
000 / 445 / 00 / /	1	3	21/11/02	1/2" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET VALVE PILOT
SSBVM15/3NV			0 / /0 0 /0 /	OPERATED SPRING RETURN
000) (1445 (01450)	1	1	26/08/04	LOW TEMPERATURE ½" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET
SSBVM15/3NEP ^[1]			10/00/00	VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
CCD\/Maaa/ani\/	1	1	19/09/03	3/4" NPT 3-WAY POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED
SSBVM22/3NV			00/00/05	SPRING RETURN
SSBVM22/3N-EP ^[1]	1	1	09/08/05	LOW TEMPERATURE 3/4" NPT 3-WAY POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
SSDVIVIZZ/SIN-EP	1	1	07/07/03	1" NPT 3-WAY POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED
SSBVM28/3NV	l I	I	07/07/03	SPRING RETURN
33DV1V120/31VV	1	1	05/06/06	LOW TEMPERATURE 1" NPT 3-WAY POPPET VALVE
SSBVM28/3N-EP ^[1]	'		03/00/00	PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
OOD VIVIZO/OI V EI	1	2	15/11/02	1.¼" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET VALVE PILOT
SSBVM35/3NV	'	_	13/11/02	OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	22/03/07	LOW TEMPERATURE 1¼" NPT 3 WAY SS316
SSBVM35/3N-EP ^[1]		-		POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	14/10/03	1.½" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET VALVE PILOT
SSBVM42/3NV				OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	12/12/05	LOW TEMPERATURE 1½" NPT 3 WAY SS316
SSBVM42/3N-EP ^[1]				POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	04/04/11	2" NPT POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING
SSBVM51/3NV				RETURN
	1	5	16/12/10	3" NPT POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING
SSBVM76/3NV				RETURN

^[1] New addition in FSP11016/02.



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Conditions of Certification

The validity of the certified base data is conditional on the manufacturer complying with the following conditions:

- 1. The manufacturer shall analyse failure data from returned products on an on-going basis. Sira Certification Service shall be informed in the event of any indication that the actual failure rates are worse than the certified failure rates. (A process to rate the validity of field data should be used. To this end, the manufacturer should co-operate with users to operate a formal field-experience feedback programme).
- 2. Sira shall be notified in advance (with an impact analysis report) before any modifications to the certified equipment or the functional safety information in the user documentation is carried out. Sira may need to perform a re-assessment if modifications are judged to affect the product's functional safety certified herein.
- 3. On-going lifecycle activities associated with this product (e.g., modifications, corrective actions, field failure analysis) shall be subject to surveillance by Sira in accordance with 'Regulations Applicable to the Holders of Sira Certificates'.

Conditions of Safe Use

The validity of the certified base data in any specific user application is conditional on the user complying with the following conditions:

- 1. The user shall comply with the requirements given in the manufacturer's user documentation (referred to in Table 3 above) in regard to all relevant functional safety aspects such as application of use, installation, operation, maintenance, proof tests, maximum ratings, environmental conditions, repair, etc;
- 2. Selection of this equipment for use in safety functions and the installation, configuration, overall validation, maintenance and repair shall only be carried out by competent personnel, observing all the manufacturer's conditions and recommendations in the user documentation.
- 3. All information associated with any field failures of this product should be collected under a dependability management process (e.g., IEC 60300-3-2) and reported to the manufacturer.
- 4. The unit should be tested at regular intervals to identify any malfunctions; in accordance with the safety manual.

General Conditions and Notes

- 1. This certificate is based upon a functional safety assessment of the product described in Sira Test & Certification Assessment Report R56A25037A3 and any further reports referenced in that report (under previous Sira projects).
- 2. If certified product or system is found not to comply, Sira Certification Service should be notified immediately at the address shown on this certificate.
- 3. The use of this Certificate and the Sira Certification Mark that can be applied to the product or used in publicity material are subject to the 'Regulations Applicable to the Holders of Sira Certificates' and 'Supplementary Regulations Specific to Functional Safety Certification'.
- 4. This document remains the property of Sira and shall be returned when requested by the issuer.

Certificate History

Issue Date Project No.		Project No.	Comment
05	16/02/2016	70113700	Re-issue of certificate post successful recertification.



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