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Report no.: TAI-FS-R-22-0083 Rev. 01

SIL SUMMARY REPORT

IEC 61508-1/7:2010

Pneumatic / hydraulic compact scotch-yoke spring return and double acting actuator

Series RC

Rotork Sweden AB
Kontrollvägen, 15
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Sweden

Date: **2023-03-20**

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Signature

This document is only valid in its entirety, without any change.

0 STATUS OF THE DOCUMENT

History:	R 01:	General revision to: • Better detail the external diagnostic test as on-line monitoring • Correct some typo errors Main modifications in respect to Rev. 00 are in green colour.	Date: 2023-03-20
	R 00:	Initial release	Date: 2022-09-09
Release status:	Released to client		
Author(s):	Carlo Tarantola		

1 INTRODUCTION

This report is related to the assessment according to standards:

IEC 61508-1/7:2010

for the following products:

pneumatic / hydraulic compact scotch-yoke spring return and double acting actuator series RC

NOTES:

- The results of this report can be used for the assessment of a complete Safety Instrumented System.

2 ASSESSMENT AND RESULTS

Product identification		
Device	Pneumatic / hydraulic compact scotch-yoke spring return and double acting actuator	
Series	RC	
Models / configurations	RC - No on-line monitoring RC - With on-line monitoring RC88 - No on-line monitoring RC88 - With on-line monitoring	
Safety function(s)		
1.	<u>Spring return actuators:</u> Delivery of a full stroke (90° ± tolerance) driven by the spring, with power fluid exhausted from the cylinder through the control system. NOTE: considering the functioning of the actuator to perform the safety function(s), the safety functions "close" and "open" can be considered equivalent. The safety function is in both cases driven by the spring.	
1.	<u>Double acting actuators:</u> Delivery of a full stroke (90° ± tolerance) driven by the piston of cylinder, powered by the specified medium working pressure. NOTE: considering the functioning of the actuator to perform the safety function(s), the safety functions "close" and "open" can be considered equivalent.	
Mode of operation of the safety function(s)	High demand mode	
Reference standards		
General functional safety standard	IEC 61508-1/7:2010	
Product specific functional safety standard	None	
Assessment phases		
Management of functional safety / functional safety planning	Assessed	A functional safety audit of the management systems and of the functional safety planning is conducted to document and highlight that the development of the product under consideration is compliant with IEC 61508.
Safety requirements specification	Assessed	The Safety requirements specification is assessed with respect to its consistency and completeness in a comparison with the applicable requirements of IEC 61508.

Design	Assessed	The assessment of the design included the following aspects: • Quantifiable aspects: random failure rates, DC, SFF, PFH, β factors, MRT, PTC, architectural constraints • Non-quantifiable aspects: behaviour of the safety function under fault conditions, safety-related software (not applicable to the product under consideration), systematic failures, behaviour under environmental conditions See below for the results.
Verification and Validation	Assessed	The verification and validation activities performed by the manufacturer include review, analysis and tests.
Information for use	Assessed	The assessment covers: • the installation, operation and maintenance instructions (IOM Manual) • the particular instructions required by Annex D of IEC 61508 Part 2 (Safety Manual)
Modification	Assessed	Procedures for modification activity are described in specific documents, referenced in the safety planning.

Results

Selected assessment routes	• For architectural constraints: Routes 1_H and 2_H • For Systematic Capability: Route 1_S Furthermore, the requirements in paragraphs 7.4.10.1–7.4.10.7 of IEC 61508 Part 2 are assessed and considered fulfilled, as: • the product has a restricted and specified functionality and is designed to perform specified safety functions • the product has an adequate documentary evidence (including extensive operating experience and results of suitability analysis and testing), sufficient to claim the declared failure rates • the manufacturer has an effective system for reporting failures
Element type (A or B)	Type A
HFT	The product has a single channel configuration, HFT=0.
Random failure rates	The determination of random failure rates is performed with a FMEDA, integrated with field feedback, according to IEC 61508 Part 2 Par. 7.4.4.3.3, using the Bayesian approach.

Configuration	Safety function	λ_{DU} [1/h]	λ_{DD} [1/h]	λ_S [1/h]
RC spring return - No on-line monitoring	1	8,52E-08	0,00E+00	0,00E+00
RC spring return - With on-line monitoring	1	7,66E-09	7,75E-08	0,00E+00
RC88 spring return - No on-line monitoring	1	6,53E-08	0,00E+00	0,00E+00
RC88 spring return - With on-line monitoring	1	5,88E-09	5,95E-08	0,00E+00
RC double acting - No on-line monitoring	1	2,61E-08	0,00E+00	0,00E+00
RC double acting - With on-line monitoring	1	2,35E-09	2,37E-08	0,00E+00
RC88 double acting - No on-line monitoring	1	3,49E-08	0,00E+00	0,00E+00
RC88 double acting - With on-line monitoring	1	3,15E-09	3,18E-08	0,00E+00

Spurious trip rate	• Spring return actuators:
	  ○ RC: 8,70E-08 [1/h]
	  ○ RC88: 1,25E-07 [1/h]
	NOTE: failures of components of the cylinder which can generate spurious trips shall be correctly classified as “No Part” and not “Safe”, being related to components that “play no part in implementing the safety function” (see definition 3.6.16 of IEC 61508 Part 4). Anyway the spurious trip rate is estimated.

	• Double acting actuators: 0,00E+00 [1/h] NOTE: failures of components of the cylinder cannot generate spurious trips. The “spurious trip rate” is therefore 0,00E+00 [1/h]
DC	The product does not include internal diagnostics. Diagnostic is only possible via external means, e.g. with on-line monitoring by the process. The procedure for the external diagnostic tests is described in the Safety Manual.
SFF	Considering that λ_S=0, according to definitions 3.6.15 of IEC 61508 Part 4: • SFF=0 without external diagnostic tests • SFF>0 with external diagnostic tests, carried out according to definition 3.8.7 of IEC 61508 Part 4, and according to what written in the Safety Manual
PFH	• RC spring return - No on-line monitoring: 8,52E-08 [1/h] • RC spring return - With on-line monitoring: 7,66E-09 [1/h] • RC88 spring return - No on-line monitoring: 6,53E-08 [1/h] • RC88 spring return - With on-line monitoring: 5,88E-09 [1/h] • RC double acting - No on-line monitoring: 2,61E-08 [1/h] • RC double acting - With on-line monitoring: 2,35E-09 [1/h] • RC88 double acting - No on-line monitoring: 3,49E-08 [1/h] • RC88 double acting - With on-line monitoring: 3,15E-09 1/h]
β factors	$\beta=\beta_D$=0,05 • The above value is the value for 1oo2 architecture. The values for other architectures shall be calculated according to IEC 61508 Part 6, Table D.5. • The above value is calculated in the hypothesis of redundancy without diversity The β factors can be used when performing calculations for redundant architectures.
MRT	24 h The MRT considered is the Technical Mean Repair Time, i.e., it takes in consideration availability of skilled personnel, adequate tools and spare parts.
PTC	The procedure for the Proof Test is described in the Safety Manual.

Architectural constraints	The product can be used in:
	• single channel configuration:
	  ○ up to SIL 1 without on-line monitoring by the process
	  ○ up to SIL 3 considering on-line monitoring by the process
	• double channel configuration: up to SIL 3

Expected lifetime	25 years
Behaviour of the safety function under fault conditions	The product does not include internal diagnostics.
Safety related SW	No SW is used to implement the safety function.
Systematic Capability	3
Behaviour under environmental conditions	The behaviour in environmental conditions is assessed evaluating the relevant environmental tests.

Limitations for use	Make reference to the Safety Manual.

Remarks

- The random failure rates in the above table are valid for all the possible configurations of the product.
- According to the definition of IEC 61508 (in particular definitions 3.6.8 and 3.6.13 of IEC 61508 Part 4), no Safe Failures are possible in a single acting actuator: each failure mode of the actuator itself shall be classified as “Dangerous” or “No Effect” (failures which can generate the spurious operation of the safety function are only external to the actuator itself, or are related to components that “play no part in implementing the safety function”); hence, **λ_S=0 for each type of single acting actuator**.
- Failures of components of the cylinder which can generate spurious trips shall be correctly classified as “No Part” and not “Safe”, being related to components that “play no part in implementing the safety function” (see definition 3.6.16 of IEC 61508 Part 4).
  Anyway the spurious trip rate is estimated.
- According to the definition of IEC 61508 (in particular definitions 3.6.8 and 3.6.13 of IEC 61508 Part 4), no Safe Failures are possible in a double acting actuator: each failure mode of the actuator itself shall be classified as “Dangerous” or “No Effect” (failures which can generate the spurious operation of the safety function are only external to the actuator itself, and even in the case of loss of power supply the actuator “stays put”); hence, **λ_S=0 for each type of double acting actuator**.
- Failures of components of the cylinder cannot generate spurious trips.
  The “spurious trip rate” is therefore 0,00E+00 [1/h]
- The λ_S values are not divided in λ_{SD} and λ_{SU}, as this subdivision has no relevance for any of the SIL parameters.
- For further details, make reference to the Safety Manual.

Reference documents

SIL Assessment Report	TÜV AUSTRIA document no. TAI-FS-R-22-0082 Rev. 01
Safety Manual	Rotork document no. SM-RC-A-00-E